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The Honorable Joseph E. Brennan
Governor of Maine
The Blaine House
Augusta, Maine 04333
Dear Governor Brennan,
Maine now faces the difficult and costly choices that the
nation deferred in its rush from the 1950's through the 1970's to
realize the economic benefits of a civilian nuclear power
program. Today, more than forty years into the nuclear era,
there is no broad consensus on a technical solution to the
nuclear waste disposal problem. In recent weeks, a major nuclear
accident has occurred near Chernobyl in the Ukraine, the exact
causes, dimensions, and full effects of which are unknown.
In this setting, you have asked us to respond to a series of
questions on the impacts of a mandatory early shutdown of the
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant, the State's principal source of
low-level nuclear waste and its only source of high-level waste.
We have organized the report around responses to each of your
questions~ addressing legal, technical~ and economic
considerations. Our conclusions depend on many assumptions about
future oil prices, costs for alternative power sources, Maine
Yankee operating costs, and the amount of compensation due to the
plant's owners in the event of an early shutdown. They are,
therefore, not precise forecasts, but informed judgments which
bracket the likely possibilities.
The threshold question in any discussion of an early
shutdown of Maine Yankee is whether it will pass basic legal andconstitutional tests. We believe it will be very difficult, at
best, for the State of Maine to acquire the legal means to force
an early shutdown of Maine Yankee. It appears certain from a
1983 ruling of the United States Supreme Court, subsequent to the
second Maine Yankee referendum, that any effort by a State to
close a nuclear power plant because of health, safety, or
operational considerations will be found unconstitutional under
current federal law.
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This makes nuclear power reactors unique among industrial
facilities, in the degree of their insulation from State
regulation. In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to provide federal pre-emption of any State responsibility
in the area of health and safety. The reasons justifying
pre-emption at the time - such as the lack of widespread
expertise and the need to nurture a complex technology with major
defense relationships - are no longer compelling. Consequently,
we would recommend that as a precondition to another statewide
referendum on Maine Yankee, the State seek repeal in the Congress
of the pre-emptive features in the relevant federal statutes.
The Supreme Court has expressly affirmed the State's
traditional regulatory authority over economic questions,
however. Accordingly, a shutdown based on the economic costs of a
serious accident might be more legally defensible. Indeed, if
there is any argument to be made for a State-enforced closing of
a civilian nuclear power plant which might succe9d legally at
present, we believe it is that the expected costs of a
catastrophic accident would so far exceed available federal
insurance protection. To make this case, however, one would have
to address the question of accident probabilities, thereby
encountering the Supreme Court's proscription of safety from
radiation hazards as a basis for State regulation. It is,
further, unlikely that the economic costs of the nuclear waste
problem alone would suffice to enable State shutdown legislation
to survive legal challenge. Finally, a decision that Maine
Yankee power was uneconomic for Maine could simply result in the
sale of Maine utilities' share of the plant, without compelling a
shutdown.
An early shutdown of Maine Yankee would produce two
principal benefits for Maine people. First, it would eliminate
the possibility of a catastrophic operating accident; such a
risk, however small statistically, is of deep concern to many
Maine citizens. An accident with a nominal radiation release, as
was the case at Three Mile Island, could be disastrously costly;
a catastrophic release of radiation would have unparalleled costs
to human and environmental health and the Maine economy. While
we have not quantified the economic costs of such an accident,
they could greatly exceed the economic savings from continued
operation of Maine Yankee. The second benefit of an early
shutdown would be that production of low-level waste and spent
fuel at Maine Yankee would cease.
There would be two major areas of cost. First, alternative
power sources would have to be found to replace Maine Yankee,
which produces 27 percent of the electricity sold by Maine
utilities at a wholesale price of 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour.
This is considerably less expensive than any new sources of power
generation which might replace Maine Yankee.
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Extansive computer modelling by the Maine Public Utilities
Commission indicates that the total additional cost of electric
power to Maine customers between 1989 and 2008 (the intended date
of plant retirement) would be between $380 million and $3.4
billion in 1986 dollars (with the effect of inflation removed).
The wide variation in these numbers reflects the range of
possible events affecting prices of alternative energy sources,
especially oil; and their volatility. We regard the high and low
ends of the range as unlikely, and the mid-point, or about $2
billion, as a reasonable statement of likely replacement power
cost to Maine customers. The cost to out-of-State customers, who
consume one-half of the Maine Yankee output, is likely to be
similar in magnitude.
The total cost to Maine people of a 1989 shutdown, including
compensation to the plant's owners, would lie between $500
million and $6.8 billion in today's dollars. This would amount
to an increase of between 2.5 and 2~ percent in annual electric
bills, if compensation to out-of-State owners were included in
the rate structure. Alternatively, compensation could add
between $120 million and $3.4 billion in new demands on the
State's General Fund, leaving an annual increase to electric
ratepayers of between 2 and 14 percent for replacement power.
A State Planning Office analysis indicates that, in the
short run, an early shutdown would result in the loss of between
1,000 and 1,800 full-time jobs, including 290 at Maine Yankee
itself. Additional costs to industrial customers (estimated by
Central Maine Power for its customers at $806 million, 1989-2008)
could inhibit business expansion, increase consumer prices, and
materially damage Maine industries that depend heavily on
purchased electricity. These immediate effects could be overcome
in time through concerted State government leadership,
accompanied by strong citizen support of more aggressive energy
conservation, hydropower imports, and development of renewable
energy sources which could more than offset the job losses at
Maine Yankee.
There is no time before 2008 when a Maine Yankee shut-down
can be scheduled without a net cost to Maine people. The least
disruptive schedule, if an early shutdown decision were made now,
would be to work toward the mid-1990's, allowing time to develop
alternative energy sources, build the necessary transmission
facilities, and implement strong conservation programs. We wish
to emphasize, however, that devoting a portion of the State's
energy conservation and renewable resource potential to replacing
Maine Yankee would preclude their use to replace higher cost and
environmentally damaging alternatives to meet present and future
demand.
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Finally, there is no more than a tenuous legal connection
between the presence of a nuclear power generating plant and the
placement of a high-level waste repository in Maine, as is now
being contemplated by the U.S. Department of Energy. An early
shutdown of Maine Yankee would still leave its existing wastes to
be disposed of, and have no significant effect on the nation's
nuclear waste disposal problem. Neither the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982 nor federal regulations would require Maine to be
removed from consideration if Maine Yankee were closed. The Act
does require attention in repository siting to the proximity of
waste sources; but closing a single plant in the Northeast would
not materially affect this consideration.
We have not considered the many policy and ethical issues
that lie outside the scope of your questions. We thank you for
the opportunity to be of service to you and the people of Maine
in this complex and important matter. We wish especially to
express our gratitude to the staff who assembled the information
and performed the analysis upon which this report is based; they
and the reports they prepared are listed in Appendix B. These
materials are available upon request from the Maine State
Planning Office.
Most respectfully submitted,

Public Advocate

#},....~

Antho-ny Ar strong
Acting Dir ctor,
Office of Energy Resourc s
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A.

Legal Process

A State-mandated, early closing of Maine Yankee would be
without precedent in United States legal history, so one cannot
fully anticipate what arguments are likely to be raised, or how
the courts will respond to them.

It is not clear, however, that

Maine now has available to it any constitutionally supportable
tools to enforce an involuntary early shutdown of Maine Yankee.

1.

What legal authority does the State of Maine have to shut

down the Maine Yankee facility?

Under current federal law, Maine does not possess legal
authority to close Maine Yankee solely on the basis of health and
safety considerations.

That power is held by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, as stated by the United States Supreme
Court in the Pacific Gas and Electric case in 1983.1

The Court

affirmed that under federal law, "the federal government
maintains complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects of
energy generation."

It noted that "a state judgment that nuclear

power is not safe enough to be further developed would conflict
directly with the countervailing judgment of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission."

It is nearly certain, therefore, that

1 461 US 190; 103 S. Ct 1713 (1983) US Constitution Art. VI,
Clause 2; see also 42 USC Sec. 2021(k).
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any State effort to close Maine Yankee for reasons of health,
safety, or nuclear operations will be found unconstitutional
under present federal law.

Inasmuch as the law leaves to the States control over
strictly economic aspects of nuclear power generation, Maine
could potentially assert its legal authority to close Maine
Yankee on the ground that the long run economic costs of
continuing its operation and disposing of its wastes are
excessive.

Such an economic argument cannot credibly be made on

the basis of waste disposal costs alone; currently, they are
one-tenth of a cent, or 4% of the total Maine Yankee power cost
of 2.5 cents per kilowatt hour.

If these costs prove to be twice

present estimates, they would still drive Maine Yankee power
costs to just 2.6 cents per kwh.

In contrast, the effects of a nuclear accident on the Maine
economy could be severe, especially if it resulted in a
release.

radi~tion

They include the cost of dismantling a contaminated

plant; the loss of residential, commercial, industrial and
agricultural property; health care costs; l~sses in the tourism,
fishing, agricultural, and other industries important to Maine;
and disruption of local services.

The costs could greatly exceed

the insurance funds currently available, which are limited to
$600 million for public liability alone, under the federal
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Price-Anderson Act.

Even for an accident like Three Mile Island

which resulted in no material release of radiation, repair and
dismantling costs can be substantial, in the billions of dollars.

It is conceivable, and argued by some, that the State could
acquire Maine Yankee through its power to condemn for a public
use and purchase it against the wishes of its owners.

While the

purchase of Maine Yankee through condemnation cannot be dismissed
out of hand, it poses serious legal questions.

First, the

constitutional question of public use for the property would be
raised.

If that use related to health and safety concerns, a

collision with Nuclear Regulatory Commission authority would
arise.

Some other plausible basis, such as the unacceptable

economic risk mentioned above, would have to be asserted and
sustained in court.

Other federal issues of lesser weight might be raised in
litigation following an early Maine Yankee shutdown.

Since it

would affect Maine Yankee owners and consumers in other States,
issues of federal control over interstate commerce could arise.
Specific questions relating to impairment of existing contracts
between Maine Yankee and its suppliers and customers could be
raised.

Finally, there is a question of how Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission powers over wholesale electric rates would
affect Maine's ability to close Maine Yankee.
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There ndw exist

seve~al

constraints on spent fuel storage

capacity at Maine Yankee and, therefore, on the prospects for its
continued operation.

In 1982, the Maine Legislature enacted a

law that prevents on-site storage after 1992 of fuel rods more
than three years old.2

Some have asserted that this will require

shutdown of Maine Yankee at that time.

On its face, the 1982 law

does not require closing the plant; rather, it appears only to
render the owners vulnerable to a court order to remove the older
rods, which would not necessitate closing the plant.

If there is

no place to which to remove the spent fuel rods, even closing the
plant cannot result in compliance; but we assume that the owners
will voluntarily choose not to operate Maine Yankee in violation
of Maine law.

Further, a 1984 agreement between Maine Yankee and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission prevents Maine Yankee from using
available technologies to compact its spent fuel, but allows
further re-racking to increase storage capacity.

This will

result in the on-site spent fuel storage capacity being exhausted
in the mid 1990's unless the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
license is amended to authorize additional storage.

2

35 MRSA, Sec. 3366.
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2.

How much, if anything, might it cost the State of Maine to

compensate the present owners and energy purchasers of Maine
Yankee in the event of ear}Y shutdown?

This que~tion may be answered precis~ly only following what
would certainly be extensive litigation.

The likelihood is that

out-of-state owners would be compensated through some fair market
valuation of their replacement power costs.

In-state owners

might continue to receive debt service and return-on-equity now
provided for in customer rates, so no added compensation would be
due them.

Maine Yankee's owners may assert that its fair market value
should be measured by the present value of power cost savings
attributable to it.

For Maine Yankee's out-of-state owners, this

would amount to between $380 million and $3.4 billion.

Clearly,

the fair market valuation principle and its conversion to dollar
sums would be vigorously contested in court.

"Book value" is the method commonly used to evaluate utility
assets for ratemaking.

It would make some sense to use it in

eminent domain proceedings, as well; but this has not
historically been done in, for example, town takeovers of private
water systems.

There, compensation commonly exceeds book value.
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Book value is a measure of the plant's original cost, plus
additions, less depreciation; it would probably
lower limit to compensation.

the

e~tablish

The book value of Maine Yankee as

of March 31, 1986, is $314 million, of which about $100 million
is fuel; the book value of the plant itself is $212 million.

In

mid-1989, the net electric plant's value will be $185.4 million,
and the fuel's value will be $57.4 million, for a total of $242.8
million.3

One-half of this figure, or roughly $120 million,

would be the low-end of compensation due to out-of-state owners
from a 1989 shutdown.

(See Table 1.)

Table 1
MAINE YANKEE SHUTDOWN
ESTIMATED COSTS 1989-2008
(Millions of 1986 $)
'Low Case

High Case

Replacement Power for Maine Customers
Compensation to Out-of-State Owners

$380
120

$3,400
3,400

TOTAL COST

$500

$6,800

In the most unlikely event that the courts were to find the
closing of Maine Yankee to be within the State's powers of
condemnation without compensation, no payment to owners would be
necessary.

3 PUC Staff estimates.
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Several other financial facts should be recorded here.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's common equity is $68.8
million, of which CMP holds 38 percent and other Maine utilities
hold an additional 12 percent; thus, 50 percent of Maine Yankee
equity ownership is held by entities outside the State of Maine.
Other obligations of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company include
$8.5 million in preferred stock; $75.6 million in mortgage bonds
secured by the plant itself; and $50 million (plus interest from
1983) to the federal government for pre-1983 spent fuel disposal
charges.

The Property Tax Division of the State Bureau of

Taxation values

Maine Yankee at $287 million, while the Town of

Wiscasset values the plant at $380 million.

3.

What will be the likely duration and costs to the State and

to Maine utilities of litigation surrounding compensation to the
owner-utilities in the event of early shutdown?

Considering the unprecedented and highly complex nature of
such a case, we can venture no prediction of its likely duration
or cost.

Two separate issues would be litigated:

whether the

State has authority to close Maine Yankee; and,if the answer is
yes, what if any compensation should be awarded?

If the State asserts the authority to close Maine Yankee,
the litigation, while substantial, could be handled by the Office
of the Attorney General without additional staff.
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If valuation

becomes an issue, the litigation will be substantially more
complex and entail the use of expensive consultants.
in different courts are possible.

Proceedings

The many utilities which own

Maine Yankee, having the burden of proof, would spend much more
than the State.

B.

Decommissioning Constraints and Costs

This section addresses technical constraints which would
affect the timing of a shutdown, and describes our best estimates
of environmental and economic impacts of plant decommissioning.

4. and 8.

Does the technology exist today for the safe

decommissioning of a nuclear-powered generating plant?

What are

the costs of decommissioning?

No reactor of Maine Yankee's size (840 MW) has yet been
dismantled.

As a result, the decommissioning technology has not

been demonstrated.

Several theoretically safe decommissioning

methods exist; but the absence of an actual demonstration creates
serious misgivings about not only their safety, but also their
economic and political acceptability.

Between 1954 and 1985, 34 reactors of various sizes were
retired or dismantled, mostly small research and development
reactors, operated for a few years.
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Extensive experience is

being accumulated on the damaged Three Mile Island 2.

Research,

engineering, and cost studies have been done on reactor
decommissioning.

Planning is underway to dismantle a 72 MW

commercial reactor at Shippingport, Pennsylvania.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is currently working on
its final decommissioning standards, which will not be available
until 1987 or 1988.

When these are completed, more definitive

cost estimates and answers to questions of environmental and
occupational hazards may be available.

Maine Yankee owners are required to fund its full
decommissioning costs, estimated at $200 million in 1986 dollars.
In accordance with a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ruling,
Maine Yankee sets aside $4 million each year in a trust fund for
this purpose.

As of March 31, 1986, the fund contained $12.0

million; by 1989, it will be roughly $30 million; and by 2008,
$150 million in 1986 dollars (assuming a 3% real investment
yield).

As decommissioning approaches, any unfunded amount will

be paid through ratepayer charges.

Decommissioning costs cannot be avoided by early shutdown.
If Maine Yankee were shut down early, ratepayers or taxpayers
would still have to pay

$4~6

million per year for future

decommissioning.
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5., 6. and 7.

What are the public safety and environmental risks

of the decommissioning process?
thereafter?

What level of risk will remain

Where will the contaminated components of the

decommissioned plant be disposed of?

We cannot now say precisely how the wastes from either an
early shutdown or the planned 2008 shutdown would be disposed of,
where the waste disposal site would be located, or what the full
costs would be.

Final dismantling of Maine Yankee will be accompanied by the
handling of large quantities of radioactive waste, the removal of
which will involve some level of hazard.

Protecting workers and

finding an acceptable disposal site are two of the most difficult
decommissioning issues.

The spent fuel must be removed before

decommissioning can take place.

Many of the remaining wastes,

though technically defined as "low-level", are in fact highly
radioactive.

Much of the radioactivity will decay within 30

years of shutdown, but some will endure much longer.

Maine Yankee's current plans for shutdown envision permanent
removal of the spent fuel and other radioactive material from the
site to a federal repository.

There will be no available

permanent repository for spent fuel before 1998.

A shutdown

before then would entail storage of fuel and low level waste
on-site for a period of years.
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There is, at present, no known destination for the
remaining, low-level decommissioning waste, the volume of which
will be somewhat greater than that generated during the plant's
planned operating lifetime.

Low-level wastes now go to Barnwell,

South Carolina, and Hanford, Washington, at a rising annual cost.
By 1993, federal law requires Maine to have made some permanent
arrangement for disposal of its own low-level waste.

Before

then, there is no assurance that the low-level wastes generated
by post-shutdown activities will have a permanent disposal site.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

requir~s

that a nuclear

plant site be decontaminated after dismantling, and assumes that
any radiological hazards which would prevent its use for another
purpose will be removed.

Achieving this depends on the existence

of waste disposal sites, suitable transportation methods,
effective decontamination methods, and the skill with which they
are applied.

We think it wise to assume that parts of the site

are unlikely to be returned to public use for many years.

C.

Public and Economic Costs and Benefits

This section reviews power supply, energy conservation, and
replacement power costs and their economic impacts.
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9., 10., and 11.

How much electrical energy and electric

generation capacity will we need to replace Maine Yankee?

What

are the available options?

Maine Yankee has an average capacity of 840 megawatts (MWE)
and produces 4.8 billion kwh each year, of which 2.4 billion is
the share of Maine utilities.

This is 27 percent of the total

electricity sold by Maine utilities, and 19 percent of all
electricity consumed in Maine.

In addition, Maine utilities own

small shares of nuclear power plants located outside of Maine,
and rely on some nuclear power from New Brunswick.
1•)

Chart 1.
S(){JOCES OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMED IN MAINE - 1984

"Other industrial" includes electricity generated with
petroleum, wood waste, and pulp liquor. "Other nuclear"
includes out-of-state nuclear power.
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(See Chart

The near-term response to a Maine Yankee shutdown would be
to import and generate power from the same sources currently used
when Maine Yankee shuts down for maintenance.

These include

underutilized oil-fired plants in Maine, the least expensive
available units in the New England Power Pool, or special
arrangements with New Brunswick.

Conditions are especially

favorable at present because of a Canadian hydropower surplus,
low oil prices, and idle oil-fired capacity in New England.

A significant volume of generation capacity could be
displaced by electric energy conservation.

The Maine Office of

Energy Resources estimates that a concerted conservation program
could displace the equivalent of a 400 MW power plant, or an
amount almost equal to Maine's 50% share in Maine Yankee.

The

cost can be as low as 2-3 cents per kilowatt hour in today's
dollars, which is competitive with Maine Yankee and much lower
than any new supply option such as biomass, cogeneration,
Canadian hydropower, in-State hydropower, coal, or oil.

Conservation measures which the Office of Energy Resources
has recommended include electric rate design improvements, energy
building standards, appliance efficiency standards, lighting and
motor efficiency programs for commercial and industrial
businesses, and new and stepped-up residential programs.
these programs are already established; some are in the
demonstration stage; and others are in various stages of
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Some of

Over 5-10 years, significBnt power replacement could be
achieved by a combination of alternative sources.

These include

wood and other biomass; waste-to-energy plants; industrial
cogeneration; and

~ew

oil, hydropower, coal, or gas-fired plants.

Costs per kilowatt hour of all these sources are higher than at
Maine Yankee; but developing some of them will help solve other
resource management problems, as well, and will generate jobs and
revenues within Maine.

At present, the growth in Canadian domestic electricity
demand has fallen short of official expectations, creating a
large Canadian hydropower surplus.

Beyond a 10-15 year period,

this surplus and the world oil market may tighten markedly.

12. and 13.

What further amount of electricity will be needed to

meet anticipated growth?

What will be its cost?

What will be

its public safety risks and environmental costs?

Assuming demand growth of 2 percent per year to the year
2008, and allowing for a level of conservation which some find
optimistic, CMP energy use will rise from 8,700 GWH in 1986 to
13,767 in 2008, or by almost 60 percent.

CMP projects available

capacity rising from 1,717 MW in 1986 to 2,078 MW in 2008.
cost of replacement power is discussed specifically in the
response to question #14.
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The

Meaningful compqrison of the health and environmental
impacts of the
prodigious
diff~rent

~lternative

undert~king.

energy sources available to Maine is a

Different national studies have come to

conclusions, and

would not feel confident in going

w~

beyond the following propositions.

First, however, no discussion of the environmental costs of
alternative energy sources may proceed without some recognition
of the grave public safety and environmental hazards qssociated
with nuclear energy.

During routine operation, U.S. nuclear

reactors release very small amounts of radioactivity which cause
few 3dverse health effects.

The nuclear industry, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, and the U.S,. operqting history to date
off~r

strong assurances that the risk of a serious nuclear

accident at any individual plant is extremely small.

Critics of

the nuclear industry contest these assurances.

If a catastrophic nuclear accident, however unlikely at a
giv~n

plant, were to occur, it would have enduring impacts on

public health, safety, the environment, and the economy that defy
comparison with other energy sources.
includ~s

The nuclear fuel cycle

the additional impacts of uranium mining and tailings,

as well as the ultimate disposal of radioactive

wast~s,

the

difficulties of which are now well-known to Maine citizens and
are discussed in detqil in the
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r~cent

''State of Maine Comments on

U.S. Department of Energy CRP Draft Area Recommendation Report"
(Governor's Task Force on High-Level Nuclear Waste, April 1986).

The lowest environmental and health risks among Maine's
alternative energy sources are those associated with energy
conservation; but even here, sensible safety and health
procedures must be followed to avoid problems such as those which
have occurred with certain types of foam insulation.

Imports of electricity have few direct environmental or
health costs to Maine residents since their impacts occur
elsewhere, except for transmission line construction.
Over-reliance on imported electricity, however, carries with it
the possibility of sudden disruption in supply.

Electricity generated by oil or coal has environmental and
public safety costs that include oil spills, air pollution, and
strip mining and mining accidents.

There are also the

world-scale environmental costs of depleting finite reserves and
modifying the global carbon dioxide cycle, as well as the
strategic risk of becoming overly-reliant on oil from politically
unstable regions.

The use of Maine resources such as hydropower, wood, peat,
and municipal waste would cause environmental impacts within
Maine.

Woodstoves have caused fatal fires and, in some cases,
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contribute to local air pollution;

waste-burning facilities may

emit harmful chemicals; hydropower projects affect a river's
ecosystems and alternative uses; peat mining can lower water
tables and affect wildlife habitat; and increased harvesting of
biomass carries with it costs associated with the high rate of
worker accidents in the industry.

Sensible government

regulation, however, can keep the environmental costs of
developing these energy resources within limits acceptable to
most Maine citizens.

Natural gas is a clean-burning fuel which could be used much
more widely in Maine in the long run.

The construction of a

pipeline through Maine would be the major environmental impact.
At current prices, however, major gas expansions are not
economical.

14. and 16.
shutdown?

How much would electric rates increase from an early
What would be their overall effect on the Maine

economy?

Our best estimates of the increased costs to replace Maine
Yankee power are shown in Table 2.

They were developed using

cost models at the Public Utilities Commission.

The ranges

represent replacement costs under high and low assumptions for
nuclear operating costs and oil prices.
per year in all cases.

Load growth is 2 percent

While a far more complex set of

27

assumptions could be used, we feel that the model captures the
most important relationships.

A much more refined approach would

not be likely to change the results materially, especially
considering the wide uncertainties in future oil prices and
nuclear costs.

Table 2
REPLACEMENT POWER COSTS FOR MAINE YANKEE
(all figures in millions of 1986 dollars)

Undiscounted
Annual
Average

Total

$380-3,400

$20-170

$190-1,926

750-6,800

40-340

380-3,850

Total
Maine Ratepayers
New England
Ratepayers

Present Value*
Discounted
at 5 percent

*Present value represents the 1986 value of the futu~e increase
in costs occurring annually throughout the 1989-2008 period.

Power replacement costs for Maine Yankee to be borne by
Maine people and businesses will be in the range of $380 million
to $3.4 billion.

This excludes the higher costs of doing

business in Maine that would be passed along to Maine consumers
in the prices

th~y

pay.

Rate increases to cover replacement

power costs would vary across the State and be significantly
higher in Aroostook County, for example, where consumers depend
more heavily on Maine Yankee power (45 percent) than the State as
a whole.

Table 3 shows the impacts on typical electric rates for

CMP customers when compensation to out-of-state owners is added
to power replacement costs.
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Table 3
IMPACT OF MAINE YANKEE SHUTDOWN ON CMP ELECTRIC BILLS*
(all figures in dollars)
Annual Increase, 1989-2008

Present
Annual Bill

Low Case

Mid-Range

High Case

$320

$ 8

$49

$ 90

600

15

91

168

1,280

32

196

360

Small business

20,000

500

2,800

5,600

Lqrge industry

4,000,000

100,000

690,000

1,280,000

Residential customer:
without electric
heat or hot water
without electric
heat, with electric
hot water
with both electric
heat and hot water

* Comp2nsation to out-of-state owners is included in these
estimates. If compensation is funded otherwise, the annual
incraases are cut approximately in half in the high case,
and by one-quarter in the low case.

r

There are two ways in which compensation to out-of-state
owners might be funded.

Table 3 includes the funding of

compensation through electric rates.

Alternatively, compensation

(between $120 million and $3.4 billion) would add a major demand
on the State's General Fund and bonding capacity.
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We have not fully examined all the economic effects of an
early shutdown, but would point to several specific, likely
outcomes.

Because of the shutdown itself and business responses

to higher energy costs, between 1,000 and 1,800 full-time
equivalent jobs would be lost to Maine people by 1995, based on
calculations using the State Planning Office's economic model.
Maine Yankee itself accounts for 640 of these jobs, including
part-time contractor employment.

The range in job losses is far

narrower than in replacement energy costs, because relatively few
Maine jobs are highly sensitive to energy costs.

The lost jobs

would be less than 1 percent of the 260,000 full-time, year-round
jobs now available.

The reduction in personal income would be

between $67 and $93 million per year, or 7 tenths of one percent
of the State's personal income of $13.4 billion annually.

Power supply and energy conservation projects developed to
replace Maine Yankee would probably create far more jobs than
those lost through a Maine Yankee closing.

Studies indicate that

energy conservation and renewable resource development could
create as many as four times the number of jobs as nuclear power.
In 1985, ongoing utility conservation projects

creat~d

more than

100 jobs, and energy conservation projects are expected to yield
far larger numbers of jobs as utility investment in conservation
is increased.

Maine's wood-to-energy industry created more than

600 jobs in 1985 for construction workers, woodsworkers, and
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truckers, according to a new study for the New England Governors'
Conference.

Using labor coefficients developed in that study,

the Office of Energy Resources estimates that more than 2800
construction jobs and 2400 sustained jobs will be created by the
wood-energy industry in Maine by 1990.

The jobs created by energy conservation and renewable
resource development will come at a high cost to Maine people in
the event of a Maine Yankee shutdown, however.

They will be

created at a lower cost if these energy sources are used to
displace new and expensive power plants instead of Maine Yankee.

Maine Yankee pays State and local taxes of $9.7 million
annually, mostly in Wisc8sset property taxes.

When Maine Yankee

shuts down, its property taxes will become minimal, causing a
dramatic increase in local tax rates.

Its State tax payments are

nominal, and could be easily made up otherwise.

We have not

estimated the potential effect on State tax revenues of the job
and local property tax losses; nor have we estimated any property
tax gains from replacement sources.

15. and 17.

How would business energy costs and investment

decisions be affected by the uncertainty over the cost and
availability of electricity resulting from an early shutdown?

CMP estimates that a 1989 shutdown would increase its
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industrial users' power bills between 1989 and 2008 by a total of
$806 million, in 1986 dollars.
reasonable estimate.
fuel

co~ponent,

We believe this to be a

Because industrial power rates have a high

the relative effect of an early shutdown on

industry would be greater than on residential customers.

To assess the effects of an early shutdown on Maine
business, it is necessary to distinguish among different kinds of
businesses.

First, are the large, energy intensive users, like

paper, chemical, and food processing companies.

Most have high

bills for purchased power, since they do not generate all the
energy they need.

Second, is the general range of manufacturing

and commercial establishments for which electricity costs would
be a concern, but of secondary importance in location and
investment decisions.

Finally, are the many retail and service

firms whose electricity costs are small, and whose growth and
expansion decisions are likely to be unaffected by power costs.

For heavy electric users, an immediate shift to replacement
power would be difficult and costly in the short run.

CMP

estimates that its paper industry customers alone, already under
intense competitive pressure, would pay $5 million in increased
power rates in the first year of an early shutdown.

Long term

adjustments could mitigate this effect to some extent.

For the second tier of users, uncertainty in electricity
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costs would have significant short-term effects only for
particular firms.

An early shutdown would incre8se the

importance of oil prices to industrial power rates; this would in
turn increase the volatility of all rates, including those for
Canadian power imports, whose price is generally tied to oil.

For the third tier of users, mostly in the retail and
service sector, we would expect no noticable effect on their
employment, output, or investment decisions.

While they would

certainly not welcome the rate increase caused by a Maine Yankee
shutdown, they would not be significantly affected, as most of
their increased costs would be passed on to consumers.

Finally, some observers may see an early Maine Yankee
shutdown as an anti-business statement by the State of Maine.
Such a perception could affect their current business investment
choices among competing locations.

Over time, Maine's natural

advantages would re-assert themselves; but a temporary chilling
effect among such people on Maine's reputation as a place to do

.
~

(

business may be expected.

18.

How will an early closing of Maine Yankee affect the State's

long term energy independence and other energy related goals?

Maine's State Energy Plan declares that "the long-term
policy of the State of Maine shall be to encourage increased
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energy conservation, efficiency, and diversification, and the use
of indigenous and renewable resources, so that the State can be
more nearly self-sufficient.

In the interim, the State should

encourage the development and use of resources, consistent with
this goal, which are the least harmful to the environment, which
stimulate economic development, which promote security of supply,
and which are available at the lowest possible cost.

In

addition, the State should be prepared to take emergency action
in case of serious supply deficiencies."

The Maine Office of Energy Resources has established

th~

following targets for 1990, to help carry out the State Energy
Plan:

1.

Increase the efficiency of energy use by 10 percent;

2.

Diversify Maine's energy supplies, and decrease our
dependence on petroleum to less than 55 percent of
total State energy consumption (currently 60 percent);
and

3.

Increase the use of indigenous and renewable resources
to 35 precent of total State energy consumption
(currently 25 percent).

A 1989 Maine Yankee shutdown would compromise some of our
energy policy goals in the short run, given the lack of time for
adequate adjustment measures.

It would increase our use of
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petroleum products; remove from Maine's energy mix a supply of
low-cost, in-state generated electricity; increase energy costs
to consumers and enirgy-intensive businesses; and have at least a
short-term, adverse affect on economic development in Maine.

Within a few years, aggressive State government and utility
company policies, backed by strong public support, could place
Maine on a sound energy supply path for the future.

A concerted

conservation effort in Maine government, industries, businesses,
and homes would have a favorable impact on the State's long-term
energy independence, job creation, and other goals.

A major

initiative could be made to replace Maine Yankee power with
increased electric generation from indigenous, renewable
resources, including biomass and hydropower.

All this would be

consistent with State energy policy and goals, since it would
create jobs and develop secure, in-state, renewable supplies of
energy.

The energy from renewable resources would, however, be far
more expensive than Maine Yankee power, and so would compromise
Maine's policy goal of supplying energy at the lowest available
cost.

Some conservation programs, while similar in cost to Maine

Yankee electricity, would be otherwise used to offset the future
need for new power sources which will be far more expensive than
Maine Yankee.

An early shutdown of Maine Yankee would increase

energy costs to Maine consumers, who have traditionally paid a
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higher percentage of their income for energy than residents of
any other State in the country.

In addition to increasing energy costs, an early shutdown
could be a setback to Maine's efforts to increase efficiency of
electric supply through regional cooperation with the New England
Power Pool.

Other members of the Pool would be adversely

affected by a unilateral decision by Maine to close the Maine
Yankee plant.

19.

How would an early shutdown affect the local economy and tax

revenues in Wiscasset and neighboring communities?

Maine Yankee is an important part of both the tax and
economic base of Wiscasset.

The plant pays about 95 percent of

the Town's property taxes; as a result, property values are
higher than in adjacent towns.

Maine Yankee's 290 full-time

employees account for about one-fourth of the jobs in Wiscasset.

When one includes contractors, employment at Maine Yankee
grows to roughly 640 person-years, according to CMP.

The annual

Maine Yankee payroll exceeds $10 million; its purchases of
contract goods and services constitute an additional $15 million.
In the event of an early shutdown, most of these jobs, wages, and
spending flows would be lost to the area economy.

Multiplier

effects would increase the impact somewhat above these numbers,
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and over a one-hour or larger commuting radius·beyond Wiscasset.

20.

If there is to be an early shutdown, what would

b~

the least

disruptive means and schedule to do so, from an economic point of
view?

There is no time before 2008 when a Maine Yankee shut-down
can be scheduled without net economic cost to Maine people.
Easing the impact of an earlier shutdown of Maine Yankee would
necessarily entail a careful, orderly planning process, involving
fair compensation of the plant's owners and creditors.

With a vigorous effort and under favorable circumstances,
some major sources of replacement power could be available within
2-3 years of a shutdown decision.

Not until the mid-1990's,

however, is it reasonable to expect enough of the factors to come into play which are critical to an orderly post-Maine Yankee
energy replacement plan, including:
purchase or construction of desirable and permanent
replacement capacity;

completion of needed transmission lines, facilitating
power imports;

an accelerated conservation effort, backed by strong
public leadership and support;
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an improved Maine bargaining position as a result of
not having to make power purchases on a "crash" basis;

clarification of the disposal options and costs for low
and high-level nuclear waste;

better technical and economic knowledge about
post-shutdown treatment and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations; and

time to either consume or sell off commitments for
nuclear fuel and uranium enrichment services.

While these developments would ease a transition, Maine would
simultaneously face increased competition from other States for
available power and power sources, as surplus capacity
diminishes.

21.

In light of these considerations, what would be the net

benefits and costs to Maine citizens of an early Maine Yankee
shutdown?

Not all the benefits and costs of an early shutdown are
reducible to a common measure such as dollars; different
individuals attach widely varying values to the goal of ending
the use of nuclear power.
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Benefits

An early shutdown would eliminate the risks of a
catastrophic operating accident at Maine Yankee, the human and
economic costs of which would be enormous.

Low-level waste

production would cease at Maine Yankee, the State's largest
generator of this material.

However, the wastes resulting from

decommissioning would remain to be dealt with.

Further

production of spent fuel at Maine Yankee would cease, although
this will not significantly alter the nuclear waste disposal

r

problem for Maine or the nation.

It has been argued that a Maine Yankee shutdown, or even the
threat of one, would reduce the likelihood of Maine's selection
as a high-level nuclear waste repository.

The Department of

Energy's official position is that this will not be the case.
There is only a tenuous legal connection between the operation of
Maine Yankee and Maine's continued consideration as a candidate
for a high-level nuclear waste repository.

An early shutdown might accelerate the effort to develop
Maine's renewable energy resources, and prompt greater consumer
commitment to conservation, largely through higher energy prices.
Such a commitment is desirable in any case, and could occur
without an

early shutdown.
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Costs

In the event of an early shutdown, Maine citizens would face
costs for replacement power, compensation to owners and
out-of-state customers, short-term job losses, and the compromise
of some State energy policy goals.

Replacement costs for Maine Yankee power would add, on
average, between 2 and 14 percent to the annual power bill of
Maine customers, the equivalent of a $20-170 million annual tax
or rate increase.

Together, replacement power plus compensation

costs will yield likely rate increases to Maine customers of
between 2.5 and 28 percent.

This increase would be most

burdensome to poor families and businesses already facing harsh
financial and competitive problems.

Some local industries and

areas would be disproportionately affected because of heavier
dependence on Maine Yankee power.

An early shutdown would entail the near-term loss of 1,000
to 1,800 full time jobs, including those at Maine Yankee itself.
Uncertainty over power costs could last for several years,
affecting some business investment decisions.

This would likely

produce an adverse, short-term effect on Maine's economy, which
would need to be addressed through a vigorous adjustment program
in those areas hardest hit by the impacts.
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In the near-term, early shutdown would compromise Maine
energy policy goals in the areas of in-state generation, foreign
oil dependence, and overall energy costs.

Beyond that time,

energy conservation, technological changes, and investment in
alternative energy generation could, with strong public
leadership and support, place Maine on a sound, long term energy
supply path, though at higher costs than if Maine Yankee were to
continue operating.

Costs That a Shutdown Cannot Avoid

There are a number of important costs to Maine people that
cannot be avoided by an early shutdown, and will remain to be
borne in any case.

First, the plant will have to be decommissioned at a cost of
roughly $200 million (in 1986 dollars) at some future time; early
shutdown does not alter or reduce this cost; ratepayers will
continue to face costs of $4-6 million per year for this purpose.
Second, the plant's debt service and preferred stock dividends
now covered by consumer rates amount to some $7 million per year;
they will decline over time, but must still be paid through 2008.
Third, a remaining liability of $$0 million plus interest for
pre-1983 spent fuel charges is owed by Maine Yankee to the U.S.
Department of Energy.

Finally, the spent fuel rods and any
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wastes from the shutdown process will have to remain at the Maine
Yankee site until at least 1993 for low-level wastes, and 1998
for the spent fuel, due to lack of permanent disposal facilities
for them.

22~

What conclusions, if any, may be drawn from the recent

accident at the Chernobyl reactor in the USSR?

You have asked that we comment on the recent nuclear
accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union.

Until much more is known about the causes and consequences
of the accident, a precise assessment of its relationship to U.S.
nuclear power plants in general, or to Maine Yankee in
particular, will not be possible.

Among other things, it is not

yet clear what type of containment the Chernobyl reactor had, or
whether an accident of this magnitude would have ruptured a
U.S.-style containment.

Nor is it clear that the graphite fire

(which could not occur in most U.S. reactors) was a cause rather
than a consequence of the accident itself.

Under these circumstances, we would not venture with
confidence beyond the following general observations regarding
the impact of Chernobyl on the economic and waste considerations
you have asked us to address.
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First, the Soviet accident may have some adverse effect on
the cost of capital to utilities owning nuclear power plants.

Second, the accident makes very clear the need for much
higher limits on liability than the current limit of some $600
million written into the federal Price-Anderson Act.

Indeed, a

system of unlimited liability for total costs, coupled with some
limit on the annual payment per reactor, may well be a fairer way
to balance the interests of all parties than is the current
Price-Anderson framework.

The nuclear industry opposes this

approach, however, as unlimited liability will increase the cost
of nuclear power at new and existing plants.

Finally, there is no direct connection between the Soviet
accident and the nuclear waste problem that initially triggered
this review.

An accident of this magnitude involving underground

spent fuel does not appear possible.

However, it is safe to say

that any nuclear endeavor requiring popular approval and support
will now be more difficult to carry out than it would have been
before Chernobyl.
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STATE OF MAINE
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

AUGUSTA • MAINE

04383

JOSEPH E.'BRENNAN

March 11 , 1 9 8 6

GOVERNOR

Dr. Richard E. Barringer
Maine State Planning Office
State House Station 38
Augusta, Maine 04333
Dear Dick,
As you know, the public debate on the Maine Yankee
atomic power plant has been re-opened by the actions of
the U.S. Department of Energy and its failed,
high-level nuclear waste storage policy. Accordingly,
it is important that this Administration re-evaluate
the implications for Maine people of an early shutdown
of Maine Yankee.
Accordingly, I will be obliged if you, the Public
Advocate, the Director of the Office of Energy
Resources, and the Chairman of the Public Utilities
Commission, in cooperation with the Office of the
Attorney General, will address the following questions
and report to me your findings at an early time.
If in
the course of your efforts other questions of direct
interest arise, I trust that you will respond to them,
as well.
In considering these questions, one should bear
several things in mind.
First, Maine Yankee must
eventually be decommissioned; its current operating
license from the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission
expires in the year 2008. Second, before its
decommissioning, alternate sources of power with
different costs and their own environmental and health
effects will need to be developed in Maine, or
purchased. Third, an early Maine Yankee shutdown would
involve owners from out-of-state, and would affect
power supply and costs for out-of-state utilities and
consumers, as well as for those in Maine.
Fourth,
early shutdown of Maine Yankee will not in itself
guarantee that Maine will not be the site of a nuclear
repository, and might result in increased electrical
costs to Maine people with no additional protection
from our being the repository State.

A-1

Dr. Richard E. Barringer
Page two
There are at least three kinds of issues which
should be addressed regarding a mandated early shutdown
of Maine Yankee, including legal, technical, and
economic:
A.

B.

C.

Legal Process
1.

What legal authority does the State of Maine
have to shut down the Maine Yankee facility?

2.

How much, if anything, might it cost the State
of Maine to compensate the present owners and
energy purchasers of Maine Yankee in the event
of early shutdown?

3.

What will be the likely duration and costs to
the State and to Maine utilities of litigation
surrounding compensation to the owner
utilities, in the event of early shutdown?

Technical Constraints
4.

Does the technology exist today for the safe
decommissioning of a nuclear-powered generation
plant?

5.

How and where will the contaminated components
of the decommissioned plant be disposed of?

6.

What are the public safety and environmental
risks of the decommissioning process?

7.

What public safety and environmental risks
remain after decommissioning process?

8.

What are the costs for decommissiong the plant
and the subsequent security and maintenance of
the site?

Public and Economic Costs and Benefits
9.

How much electric generation capacity will we
need to replace Maine Yankee?

10.

How much electrical energy will be needed to
replace Maine's share of the electricity
generated by Maine Yankee?
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11.

What are the options for supplying the
replacement power or reducing the demand
through conservation, and what are their
economic costs?

12.

What further amount of electricity will be
needed to meet anticipated growth in demand,
regardless of the date of the shutdown of
Maine Yankee, and what will be its likely cost
to consumers?

13.

What are the public safety risks and
environmental costs of alternative energy
sources?

14.

How much would electric rates increase for
Maine consumers to replaGe Maine Yankee power
with alternatively generated electricity?

15.

How would an early shutdown of Maine Yankee
affect the energy costs of Maine businesses?

16.

What would be the overall effects of more
expensive replacement power on the Maine
economy, including State tax revenues?

17.

How would business investment decisions be
affected by the uncertainty over the cost and
availability of electricity resulting from
early shutdown?

18.

How will an early closing of Maine Yankee
affect the State's long-term energy
independence and other energy-related goals?

19.

How would an early shutdown affect the local
economy and tax revenues in Wiscasset and
neighboring communities?

20.

If there is to be an early shutdown, what
would be the least disruptive means and
schedule to do so, from an economic point of
view?

21.

Finally, give all these factors, what would be
the net benefits and costs to Maine citizens
of an early shutdown of Maine Yankee?
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Again, I thank you and your colleagues for your
readiness to assume this most important responsibility.
Sincerely,

~

Gave~~~

JOSEF

BRENNAN

JEB:nv
cc:

Peter Bradford, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission
Paul Fritzsche, Public Advocate
John Kerry, Director of Energy Resources
James Tierney, Attorney General
Senate President Charles Pray
Speaker John Martin
Senator John Baldacci
Representative Harry Vose
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STAFF PARTICIPANTS
State Planning Office:
Joyce Benson

Lloyd C. Irland, Harold Payson, and

Office of Energy Resources:
Barbara Reinertsen

Steve Buchsbaum, Mark Katz, and

Public Utilities Commission: Elizabeth Paine, Richard Darling,
Richard Parker, Alfred W. Maxwell III, Joseph Sukaskas, and
Richard Kania
Public Advocate:
Attorney General:

Joel Shifman
Cabanne H. Howard

Word Processing: Barbara A. Macomber, Lorraine Lessard, and
Aline A. Lachance, State Planning Office
STAFF PAPERS
Attorney General's Office Letter on Legal Issues, April 2, 1986
Office of Energy Resources Memorandum on Energy Conservation,
April 10, 1986
Office of Energy Resources Memorandum on Employment Effects of
Wood-Energy Development in Maine, May 21, 1986.
Public Utilities Commission Memorandum on Replacement Power Cost
Estimates, April 14, 1986
State Planning Office Memorandum on Local Economic Impacts,
March 26, 1986
State Planning Office Memorandum on Job Loss Estimates,
April 18, 1986
State Planning Office Memorandum on Decommissioning Costs,
March 1986
CORRESPONDENCE
National Economic Research Associates, Letter to John W. Rowe,
February 26, 1986
Correspondence between Representative Harry L. Vose and Ben C.
Rusche, U.S. Department of Energy, March 21 and March 25,
1986

Note: Staff papers and correspondence are available upon request
from the Maine State Planning Office.
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STATE OF MAINE

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
242 State Street
State House Station 18
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 289-3831

May 21, 1986

The Honorable Joseph E. Brennan
Governor
The State of Maine
Station No. 1
Augusta, Maine 04333
Dear Governor Brennan:
I have participated in this review in an individual capacity.
other PUC commissioners have not been involved.

The

Because both I and the PUC may have to review these matters again on a
different future record, I have not signed the report itself lest that act
be misunderstood as linplying same prejudice with regard to future PUC
proceedings. The conclusions reached are generally consistent with ~
present views.

Peter A. Bradford
Chairman
PAB/m
Enc 1
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